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ABSTRACT
This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares
in the Russian market. Conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount.
However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of
future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common
factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the data, implying that corporate control
issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount.
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andrey.ukhov@yale.edu...Russia has a strategic goal – to become a country that makes competitive goods and renders
competitive services. All our efforts are committed to this goal. We understand that we have
to solve questions pertaining to the protection of owners' rights and the improvement of
corporate governance and financial transparency in business in order to be integrated into
world capital markets.
Vladimir Putin's speech at the World Economic Forum in Moscow
(10/30/01)
It is widely believed by participants in the Russian market that corporate governance issues
are at least as important as fundamental economic factors in the valuation of Russian securities.  In
fact, this is what makes the Russian markets so appealing for academic research.  Governance in
Russia presumably has a first-order, rather than a second-order valuation effect, an observation that
may explain why many Russian companies look attractive based on various valuation metrics.  For
example, oil firms currently appear to be undervalued on the basis of the ratio of reserves to their
stock price. These attractive valuations, however, are meaningless to minority shareholders if
managers or a controlling shareholder block can transfer resources to themselves. Hence corporate
governance issues have attracted considerable investor attention. One of the leading Russian
investment banks, Troika Dialog, publishes a weekly newsletter Corporate Governance Weekly. The
publication discusses changes in laws and regulations, reports legal cases, and discusses corporate
events. Undoubtedly, their customers consider this information value-relevant.
The emerging awareness of corporate governance issues in the last two years has, perhaps,
lead to some positive changes in the Russian corporate governance landscape.  For example, there
are now a few cases in which minority shareholders have successfully defended their rights. 
Nevertheless, a natural presumption about the primary determinants of share price in Russia is that2
 issues of control far outweigh such measures of earnings and asset values – hence the quote from
President Putin above.  
This paper explores an odd empirical deviation from the law of one price that might appear
– at first –  to be due to the relatively poor legal protections for minority shareholders in Russia.   In
order to understand this deviation, the analysis examines models of minority expropriation designed
to parameterize this intuition.  It finds that assumptions regarding the magnitude and timing of
expropriation would have to be so extreme as to be incredible – even in the context of Russia’s rough
and ready corporate environment.   For those who insist on a pure corporate control explanation, this
leaves the conclusion that extreme investor priors about expropriation have very large effects on the
valuation of Russian securities.
The empirical analysis focuses on the relative pricing of  the common and preferred shares
of Russian companies.  These securities differ only in their relative proportions in the equity capital
structure, and in the type of issues on which they vote.   In addition, preferred shares have a novel
constraint on dividends that makes it easy to model their relative value to common. Unlike typical
U.S. preferred stocks,  which have a promised annual cash payment, the dividends of  Russian
preferred shares are legally bounded below by the dividends to the common. If, as normally assumed
in equity valuation, the stream of future dividends represents all the benefits that can accrue to
shareholders, then the common and preferred valuation ratio should be reversed - the preferred
should always sell for more than the common.  In fact, they almost never do.  In this paper, we
investigate whether this discrepancy may be the result of the potential for expropriation of one class
of shareholders by another. 1While corporate control issues may not fully explain the discount this paper does not claim the
unexplained part must be due to irrationality in the market.  Indeed while that may be true, it may
instead be that the price discrepancy arises from the potential for multiple market equilibria such
as those found in Spiegel (1998).
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It is well known that differential voting rights can account for large pricing differentials in
some markets (c.f. Zingales, 1994&1995).  However, a useful question is whether the pricing
differential between voting and non-voting shares correctly estimates the ex ante value that can
accrue to one class of shareholders.  This paper builds a simple model of expropriation and then
evaluates it using current Russian company share prices and dividends.  Empirically it appears that
the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events will have to be very high to justify the preferred
share discounts that currently prevail.   A factor analysis is then conducted in order to assess whether
the risk of such expropriation events is idiosyncratic or systematic.  The results indicate that there
exists a common factor potentially related to investor perceptions about corporate governance.  Thus,
at least some of the relative discount may be due to corporate control issues.
1
1 Russian Preferred Shares
When the Russian government privatized its industries, for many firms, it created  two classes of
stock.  The first, common shares, are typical of those found in many western countries.  The second,
however, is relatively unique.  At the time, the government wanted to protect each firm’s employees,
while simultaneously giving them a stake in their own firm.  To do so, “preferred” shares were
created and distributed.  These shares are very different from those normally seen in the U.S. and
European markets in that they come with special voting and cash flow rights.  The apparent purpose
of these rights is to ensure that the preferred shares remain at least as valuable as the common.
However, despite these protections the common nearly always sells for more than the preferred.2 This, of course, means that the definition of net profits can be crucial to valuation. In
recognition of the potential for concealing profits to the detriment of preferred shareholders,
Russian regulators in the year 2001 "tightened" the definition of accounting profits. In fact,
however, most Russian companies have been paying out, rather than avoiding, significant
preferred dividends.  (See Table 1, which lists the dividends paid on common and preferred
shares for nine firms.)  
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Typically the answer to a “puzzle” like this is that the price of the common includes control, and
liquidity premia.  Of course, such models can produce relative market prices like those observed in
the Russian data.  But, as the analysis presented here shows, such explanations are difficult to
reconcile with the size of the price discrepancy.  Empirically, the difference in liquidity between the
two securities is not that large.  This leaves only the hypothesis that some fairly dire scenarios await
the preferred shareholders with a high degree of probability in the very near future.  Thus, this paper
presents something of puzzle in the sense of the famous “equity premium puzzle.”  Yes, corporate
control models can explain the observed phenomena, but the estimated parameters from such models
do not seem reasonable.
Russian companies are allowed to issue bonds, common stock, preferred stock, warrants and
convertible bonds.  For the purposes of this paper the preferred shares have two special rights of
particular salience.  First, most company charters require that preferred shares receive a dividend at
least equal to some fixed percentage of the annual net profits, often 10%.
2  (Note, they differ from
western preferred shares that typically offer a fixed annual monetary amount.)  Second, the preferred
shareholders must receive a dividend at least as large as the dividend given to the common shares.
A typical corporate charter such as that for Surgutneftegaz spells this out as follows:
The total amount of the dividend on each preferred share shall be
fixed at 10 percent of the net income of the Company at the end of the
last financial year divided by the number of stock which constitutes
25% of the company's share capital. If the amount of dividends paid3 Resolution on Issue of Securities Preferred Registered Stock of Open Joint Stock Company
Surgutneftegaz, September 20, 1997.
4 By law the preferred can only represent up to 25% of a firm’s capital as calculated via the
original par value of the preferred and common equity.  This implies that even if the preferred
shareholders unanimously oppose a measure it will pass if the common votes at least 2 to 1 in
favor.  On the other hand, anybody that owned 100% of the preferred stock and 1/3 of the
common would have voting control.  Thus, even in this case, it is not clear that control issues
should either negatively or positively influence the value of the preferred shares relative to the
common.
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by the Company on each common stock in a certain year exceeds the
amount of dividends payable on each preferred stock, the amount of
dividends payable on the latter must be increased to the amount of
dividends payable on the common stock. The Company shall have no
right to pay any dividends on the preferred stock otherwise than in the
manner provided for by its Articles of Incorporation.
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Thus, relative to the common shares, the preferred shareholders have apparently been
promised the larger cash flow stream.  As a result, for corporate control issues to explain the
observed  prices one needs to assume that at some point an entity will figure out a way to circumvent
the charter’s language and transfer cash flow from the preferred to the common. 
The above discussion naturally leads to the question of just how much protection has been
afforded the preferred shareholders.  Cash flow promises are worthless unless backed up with
sufficient control rights.  Recognizing this, Russian company charters protect the preferred shares’
dividends against splits and reverse splits. In other words, companies are not allowed to simply
increase dividends to the common shareholders by a factor of ten by splitting each share of common
ten for one.  Other protections vary across firms.  Some Russian companies simply pool all of the
equity votes when determining if a particular measure has or has not passed.
4  Other firms offer the6
preferred shareholders even more explicit protection.  For example, the Surgutneftegaz charter states
that in the event of proposed
. . . modifications or amendments to the Charter may affect the rights
and interests of the first issue Preferred Stock owners . . . the decision
has to be ratified by those owning two thirds of the Preferred Stock
. . .
With this clause in place, and sufficient legal protection via the courts, it would appear that the
preferred shareholders should be protected against any value transfers to third parties.
Given the legal protections afforded to the preferred shareholders, why do they sell for less
than the common?  One obvious answer is that via clever legal maneuvering somebody will find a
way around even the strongest protections, thus draining value from the preferred to the common
shareholders.  Several international studies on voting rights confirm that control is valuable.
According to Levy (1983), Rydqvist (1996), Horner (1988), and Zingales (1994) premiums are paid
for voting control in Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy.  Hanouna, Sarin, and Shapiro (2001)
estimate the value of control for a sample of transactions in G7 countries. They report control
premiums in the United States of approximately 30%.  
It is important, however, to study specific mechanisms by which voting control translates into
altered shareholder group cash flows since this ultimately determines valuation. Thus, this paper
goes beyond a simple statement that voting rights account for the valuation discrepancy.  Instead,
it develops two simple models of expropriation and then evaluates them with current share price and
dividend data.  The estimated parameters indicate that if future adverse shareholder events are to
explain the data, they will have to be very strong and happen very quickly.   The paper concludes
with a factor analysis to assess whether the risk of such expropriation events is idiosyncratic or
systematic. Here the findings indicate that there may very well be a common factor potentially7
related to governance. So, while governance issues undoubtably explain some portion of the
observed relative valuations, other explanations would also seem to be needed.
The paper’s structured as follows:  Section 2 describes the history and basic characteristics
of the Russian stock market.  Section 3.1 looks at the relative liquidity of the preferred and common
shares.  Section 3.2 examines several corporate control explanations for the observed common to
preferred price ratios.  Section 3.2.1 estimates a wealth transfer model, and Section 3.2.2 a takeover
premium model.  Section 4 looks at the related literature on the corporate control premium in other
countries.  Section 5 tests for a common corporate governance factor that may be influencing the
common to preferred price ratio.  Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Russian Stock Market
2.1 History
Over the past five years, the privatization of the Russian economy has virtually undone the
most famous nationalization of industry in history.  In 1917, when most Russian corporations were
acquired or seized by the revolutionary government, the domestic and international market in
Russian debt and equity instruments was one of the most active in the world.  It operated under a set
of securities laws that had developed over the course of a century, beginning with the founding
regulations of the Saint-Petersburg stock exchange in 1816.  In the decades before the Russian
Revolution, the control of much of the nations natural resources and industrial assets were held  by
foreign and domestic investors, including oil fields, mines, railroads, tramways, electric utilities and
banks, to name only a few.  In the late 19
th and early 20
th century, in a manner surprisingly similar
to Americas own Gilded Age,  Russias eastward expansion and rapid development was financed8
by vigorous capital markets.  All this changed with the expropriation of Russian assets by the State
and the repudiation of much of the Tsarist debt by the new Russian Government.
With settlements of the Russian government debt in the early 1990’s, Russia has returned to
the global capital markets.  By the same token, with the vigorous privatization of Russian state-run
enterprises beginning in 1993, the State Property Committee (GKI) has overseen the transition of
huge sectors of the Russian economy back to their pre-revolutionary status.  The first steps taken
in 1993 distributed the ownership of a large fraction of Russian enterprises directly to Russian
citizens, and instantly established the need for a liquid securities market.  Privatization continued
until the Russian economic crisis in 1998, under a variety of auction, secured loan, and direct transfer
programs that resulted in the creation of large-scale publicly traded companies, that, like their pre-
revolutionary predecessors, have attracted the interest of foreign investors.
Russian securities regulators have been challenged  to keep up with the pace of privatization.
Security investors require enforceable property rights, laws against fraud, clear corporate rules,
organizational transparency  in short,  the entire framework of institutional rights and laws that have
developed in the United States and other capitalist nations over the period since 1917.  Despite
starting virtually from scratch,  Russian securities regulators have done a remarkable job in dealing
with the pace of change, with the  Federal Commission for the Securities Market  taking the lead in
seeking to create a positive  environment for investment. However, the Russian market is so new that
many issues have yet to be tested, despite the increasing sophistication of market participants and
the increasing complexity of corporate restructurings. 
2.2 Current Market5 Negligible amount of trading in stocks takes place on regional exchanges, - in Samara, Rostov, St.
Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and Ekateringburg.
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The majority of stock trading in Russia occurs on the floor of The Moscow Interbank
Currency Exchange (MICEX) or through the Russian Trading System (RTS).
5  MICEX began
trading stocks in March 1997, and by the end of the year it listed 50 stocks from 33 different
companies. In 1999 MICEX became the volume leader among Russian exchanges for equity trading.
Equity trading on MICEX accounted for 53% of all equity trading in Russia in 1999. By the end of
1999 MICEX listed 174 stocks by 112 issuers. In the year 2000, the volume of equity transactions
on MICEX reached 472 billion Rubles a six-fold increase against 1999. Such Russian blue chips as
Lukoil, Mosenergo, Rostelecom and Norilsk Nickel trade on MICEX.
The RTS Stock Exchange is an electronic trading floor established in 1997 by leading
Russian brokers and dealers to consolidate regional securities markets. RTS traces its origins back
to the Russian Trading System - the first electronic trading system in Russia. It began operations in
September 1995. Presently, RTS lists and trades all Russian blue chips and many regional firms.
Figure 1 plots the RTS Index and RTS daily trading volume over the period September 1,
1995 to August 31, 2001. The RTS Index is a value-weighted index computed by the Russian
Trading System based on U.S. dollar prices of 63 stocks. The performance of the index was striking
until the end of the summer of 1997. Russia appeared at the time to be a vibrant emerging market
exhibiting high share price growth. Average daily trading volume grew from  $2,276,733 in 1995
to $11.8 million in 1996 and reached $36.6 million during the first half of 1997. The all time high
of $216 million in trading on one day also occurred on October 3, 1997 – over 100 times the average
daily volume two years previously. 10
2.3 The Crash of 1997
At the end of October 1997, the Russian stock market tumbled. The RTS Index lost 93% of
its value, falling from 571.66 on October 6, 1997 to an all-time low of 38.53 on October 5, 1998.
The crisis of 1998 not only destroyed the value of the Russian stock market, but also brought trading
to a near halt.  On August 13, 1998, the Russian market closed after the first hour of trading as the
average market price dropped 6.5%.  The average daily trading volume on RTS for the last six
months of 1998 was $8.9 million. There were many days in September and October when trading
volume was below $1 million. The least active day in the history of RTS was September 25, 1998
with the total volume of trading of only $163,350! In short, Russia’s new public capital market
nearly ceased to exist. 
The trigger for the 1997 crash was almost certainly the Asian currency crisis that began in
the late Summer and early Fall of that year.  Slumping energy prices during the period also hurt
Russia’s largest firms.  The Russian government’s debt crisis added to the problem, ultimately
resulting in a $40 billion default on August 17, 1998. The Russian stock market eventually
responded to the economic recovery of 1999. The RTS index gained nearly 200% in 1999, and
dropped only 20% in 2000. The index gained 57% over the first eight months of  2001. Trading
volume, however, has not recovered to the pre-crisis levels. The average RTS daily trading volume
was $22.2 million in 2000, and $18 million in 2001, substantially lower than in 1997.  Despite
survival, the Russian stock market remains very small compared to the size of the economy. The
market capitalization of the RTS Index stocks equaled $52.92 billion as of October 25, 2001.
According to The World Factbook 2001 published by the CIA, Russia's Gross Domestic Product for11
the year 2000 is estimated at $1.12 trillion.  By comparison the same source estimates U.S. GDP to
be $9.963 trillion.  
2.4 The Historical Price Performance of Russian Preferred Shares
As noted earlier, Russian law states that the preferred shares must receive a cash flow at least
as large as the common.  Thus, it appears that the price ratio of the common to the preferred should
never exceed unity.  One can test this relationship by looking at the following five Russian
companies: Unified Energy System (EESR), Lukoil Holdings (LKOH), Norilsk Nickel (NKEL),
Rostelecom (RTKM), and Surgutneftegas (SNGS).  These firms have been selected since they have
actively traded preferred and common shares on both the Russian and U.S. stock exchanges (the
latter via ADRs). As of October 25, 2001, common and preferred shares of these firms accounted
for over 53% of the market capitalization of the RTS Index. 
Figure 2 shows the equally weighted index of the common to preferred share price ratio for
the five firms. For each day t, for each of the five firms i, i = 1,  . . ., 5  compute the ratio Xi,t of the
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the equally weighted index (EWCP Index) based on the values of Xi,t for the five firms.  Figure 2 also
shows the stock index computed by the Russian Trading System (RTS Index). The EWCP Index
values stay above one (the minimum achieved value is 1.28), representing relatively high valuation
of the common versus the preferred.   The figure also displays a very high volatility pattern for the
twelve months beginning in the summer of 1998.  Beginning from the summer of 1999, the Russian
stock market began its recovery from the 1998 crisis, as represented by the growth in the RTS Index.
The EWCP Index began its descent to its pre-crisis level only at the beginning of 2000. The average
common to preferred ratio did not reach its pre-crisis level until 2000.12
The individual price series are  shown in Figure 3. Only for Norilsk Nickel are the prices
close to being equal throughout the sample period. However, in December 2000, the prices of Lukoil
common and preferred also began to converge.  Although Figure 3 only focuses on five companies
the relative valuation of preferred and common shares is an important issue since many additional
Russian companies have these two share classes.  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics indicating
the importance of the preferred share market in Russia.  The data was retrieved manually from the
archive maintained by the RTS.  The RTS Stocks Archive includes all stocks that were,  at some
time since September 1, 1995,  listed on RTS.  There are 909 stocks in the archive. Of these 651
(72%) are Common, and 258 (28%) Preferred. There are 251 companies that have common and
preferred pairs. For some of these companies, however, there are no trades for either the common
or the preferred in the database.  The remaining 154 companies have, at some date at least, had both
common and preferred listed on RTS and recorded some trades for both classes of shares.  Another
measure of the importance of preferred shares is their relative trading volume. During the period
from September 1, 1995 until August 31, 2001 trading in common and preferred shares issued by
the firms with both classes of stock accounted for 73% of all RTS trading. Preferreds  are a small
portion of the index by capitalization, however.  There are 63 securities in the RTS Index. As of
October 25, 18 of the securities were preferred stocks,  accounting for 5.55% of the index market
capitalization. The companies that have both classes of shares account for 65.21% of the index
market capitalization.6One caveat - the entire analysis ignores the U.S. volume in ADRs and volume in other non-
domestic securities markets, which may substantially influence a particular trader’s ability to get
into or out of a position. 
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3 Explaining the Common/Preferred Price Ratio
3.1 Liquidity
Liquidity differences across securities may offer the simplest potential explanation for the
observed preferred to common price ratio.  If the preferred are less liquid they will presumably sell
for less, even if they have higher expected future cash flows.  Table 3 presents some evidence on this
issue.  Panel A shows that the volume of trade in the preferred shares for each firm is significantly
lower than the volume of trade in the corresponding common.  In terms of total dollars traded, the
common shares experience two to ten times as much volume.  However, these figures converge to
a large degree when divided by the market value of each class.
6  Thus, trading volumes in each
security class appear to be roughly proportional to their market value – an expected  result if the
relative liquidity levels are similar.
Another way to look at the liquidity issue is via a comparison with U.S. securities.  Table 3
Panel B reports the results from a matching sample of U.S. firms.  This sample contains the ten
stocks closest in market value (five above and five below) to each  Russian security in our sample.
That is,  each Russian firm has ten matching U.S. firms for its common and another ten for its
preferred.  Not too surprisingly, the U.S. firms are a lot more liquid than their Russian counterparts.
For many of the comparison groups the U.S. market has almost 100 times the trading volume.  
While the U.S. market is clearly more liquid overall, if one looks across pairs another pattern
emerges.  For any one firm, the U.S. matching sample for the common tends to have considerably14
more liquidity (relative to market value) than the set used to match the preferred.  For example, the
Rostelecom ratios for the common and preferred trading volumes (relative to market value) are 0.352
and 0.263 respectively.  For the matching U.S. sample they are 3.001 and 1.361.  Thus, many of the
Russian preferred issues appear to be have more trading volume relative to their common
counterparts than one would expect from an examination of U.S. companies with equivalent market
values.  
Although it is commonly accepted that liquidity is relevant to valuation, no researcher has
ever suggested that the liquidity premium for small stocks in the U.S. is anywhere near the levels
needed to reconcile the prices of the Russian preferred and common shares.  Consider then Table 3
as a comparison of the trading volume in small U.S. companies (those matched with the  Russian
preferred shares) and large U.S. companies (those matched with the common).  The table suggests
that liquidity drops off with size somewhat faster in the U.S. than in Russia.  Thus, it seems
reasonable to conjecture that the liquidity premium for small U.S. companies puts an upper bound
on how large a liquidity premium can exist in the Russian market for preferred shares.  Overall, it
seems unlikely that liquidity can explain more than a small fraction of the observed Russian
preferred share discount.
3.2 Corporate Control
For corporate control issues to explain the price discrepancies between the Russian common
and preferred shares then at some point in time the common shares must expect to receive a larger
cash flow than the preferred.  This differs from the simple statement that corporate control issues
have a large impact on security prices.  For example, imagine that management can expropriate a7Even this is becoming more difficult as there are emerging ever more binding restrictions on
what can be done to make this happen.  For example, in 1999 Viksunsk Pipe tried one of the
widely used tricks for diluting minority shareholders.  In this ploy, the Board at the Annual
General Shareholders’ Meeting (AGM) or Extraordinary General Shareholders’ Meeting (EGM)
of the company authorized a secondary issue of common shares, to be placed with insiders via
closed subscription, which dilutes the common. Shareholders opposed to the issue were offered a
redemption price that was substantially lower than the price, at which the new issue is placed,
Ppl . Minority shareholders could not participate in the subscription, but they also did want to sell
their shares at an artificially low price. Viksunsk Pipe offered prices set at Ppl = $10.7 and
Pred = $3, where Pred is the redemption price.  Dissenting minority shareholders consolidated
9.4% of the charter capital and demanded that the company redeem their shares at a fair price.
The shareholders ultimately won the battle, and reached an agreement to put their shares to the
company at $10 per share. While this is only one example, it illustrates the kind of corporate
conflicts and legal changes that are happening in Russia right now. 
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large fraction of a firm’s cash flows.
7  That in and of itself should not cause the preferred shares to
sell for less than the common.  For better or worse, the siphoned off cash flows do not aid the
marginal holder of the common; an ordinary investor that cannot expect to share management’s
private benefits.  Thus, while corporate control may strongly impact the absolute values across
security classes, it can only effect relative prices by somehow diverting future cash flows from one
class to the other.  For the common to sell for more, its marginal holder must expect to reap cash
flow benefits or in a competitive equilibrium the price will not be bid up past that of  the preferred.
3.2.1 A Model of Direct Wealth Transfers from the Preferred to the Common
Based upon the above discussion consider the following simple perpetual growth model,
modified to allow for the possibility that at some date in the future cash flows may be diverted from
the preferred shares to the common.  Define Dc as the total dividend paid out to the common
shareholders and Dp the dividend paid out to the preferred shareholders. Let the payout ratios for
each class of shares equal c = Dc/E  for the common and p = Dp/E for the preferred, where E equals
the firm’s next period earnings.  Since the model assumes that the firm grows at a constant rate (g),8In fact, some preferred shares are convertible into common at the will of the company. A notable
example is the conversion of Norilsk Nickel which redeemed one class of convertible preferreds
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it is natural to assume that it arises from a constant "plowback" rate of the firm’s earnings (E) into
new capital, E(1-c-p). Let ROE represent the firm’s return on equity, then g = ROE×(1-c-p).
Absent issues of expropriation, the ratio of the price of the preferred to the common will
simply equal the ratio of their current dividends.  However, under the hypothesis that control issues
explain the relative pricing of the common and preferred shares the model needs to allow for future
transfers of cash flows.  To do so assume that at some date T the preferred shareholders will have
their shares swapped for shares of the common. Let  represent one minus a swap ratio of common
shares for preferred shares.
8 A value of zero implies that the common is swapped one for one in
proportion to the dividends being paid to each class, and a value of one implies full expropriation
of the preferred shareholders.
Under the above scenario the preferred shareholders earn pE(1+g)
t-1 in period t < T.  From
date T onward they earn (1-)pE(1+g)
t-1, the rest going to the common shareholders.  Some simple
manipulations of the annuity and perpetuity formulae (assuming a constant discount rate r) yields
a valuation equation for the preferred shares of
Similarly, the common shareholders earn cE(1+g)
t-1 in period t < T, and then
(c+p)E(1+g)
t-1 so their shares are worth,9 At the end of 1999 Surgutneftegaz had 23,725,994,705 common shares outstanding. It then
registered an additional 12 billion shares on June 26, 2000 and paid 1999 dividends on these as well.
On the preferred side the firm had 7,701,998,235 preferred shares outstanding. This implies a total






























Thus, the price ratio of the common to the preferred equals
Since the model contains four free parameters, one can now see how the values of g and T
vary with each value of r and . Before going to the numerical analysis note that the growth rate only
enters the equation in terms of the form [(1+g)/(1+r)]
T.  Thus, varying   will not influence the
solution to g, only the solution to T. 
Using equation  (3) take Surgutneftegaz as an example. In 1999, investors received $0.74 per
1,000 shares of common and $3.19 per 1,000 shares of preferred.
9 Assuming no expropriation (either
 = 0, or T = ) the ratio of the value of the preferred to the common shares should be 3.19/0.74 or
4.3. Instead, the preferred typically selling for less than half the common. On March 22, 2001 (a
typical day) the preferred sold for $0.1115 and the common $0.23125, or a ratio of 0.48. 
Table 4 displays the fitted value for g and T given various values of r and  for six firms with
enough contemporaneous price and dividend data to be able to meaningfully calculate model values.
The table shows that, if the expropriation rate equals 60% or less then at the current market prices,18
it pays to short the common stock and use the proceeds to purchase the preferred shares at most
reasonable interest rates. Even with an expropriation rate of 65% for four out of seven of the sample
firms the event that would cause this wealth transfer needs to occur within three years to justify the
current relative market prices.  One item the table underscores is the close tie between the
expropriation level and date. For the most part, changes in the interest rate impact the firm’s
estimated growth rate and not the expropriation date. Conversely, changes in the expropriation rate
have a dramatic impact on the expropriation date.
The most striking result of the analysis is that, given most reasonable expropriation rates
(60% or less), the time to expropriation would have to be very soon to justify the current price
differential between Russian common and preferred shares. In particular, for Surgutneftegaz, the
only way to justify the observed market prices - even with our "disaster scenario" models - is to
assume that the market anticipates a fairly substantial wealth transfer from preferred to common in
the next few years. Sophisticated investors in Russian shares are more equipped than we to judge the
reasonableness of these assumptions, but even in the fluid regulatory framework of the modern
Russian securities markets, such expropriation assumptions would seem to be dire.  
3.2.2 Expropriation via Takeovers
Recent mergers, such as the 1999 acquisition of the oil company Komitek by Russia’s largest
oil firm Lukoil, have involved swaps of the acquiring firm’s preferred shares for the acquired firm’s
common (and presumably their preferred) shares.  If the bidding firm can purchase the target’s
common shares for more than the preferred then this may explain the observed relative prices, an
event not unheard of in Russia.  For example, in July of 1999 YUKOS released the ratios at which












Samaraneftegaz (SMNG), and Tomskneft (TOMG). Common shareholders in the subsidiaries could
swap their shares for those of the parent company YUKOS at the following ratios: 7 YUKO for 1
YFGA, 4 YUKO for 1 SMNG, and 3 YUKO for 1 TOMG. Preferred shares in each subsidiary could
be tendered for half as many YUKO commons. According to Troika Dialog, YUKOS valued its
shares at 6 rubles ($0.25) per share. This implied that YFGA was valued at $1.75, SMNG at $1.00,
and TOMG at $0.75. Troika Dialog also reported that "an independent appraisal commissioned by
shareholders produced the following fair value estimates per share: YFGA - $11.25, SMNG - $1,
TOMG - $8.5."
10 Whether or not common shareholders of the three subsidiaries were given an
attractive offer may be debatable. Still, preferred shareholders were offered only half as much.
To test the hypothesis that differential takeover terms for the common and preferred
shareholders explains the observed differential start with the perpetual growth model developed in
Section 3.2.1.  Now, drop the assumption that at date T a direct wealth transfer takes place, and
replace it with the assumption that a takeover occurs instead.  Further assume that the common
shareholders can capture all of the acquisition premium from the takeover.  Now, the only difference
between the two share prices is the expected discounted future value of the per-share acquisition
premium. Thus, the preferred’s value equals:
and the common’s: 11Note that the fitted values are set to rationalize today’s price.  Thus, it is not the case that the
results are due to a systematic undervaluation of the common stock’s future cash flows absent a
takeover.  Rather the model produces numbers such that both the takeover payout and the future































 ++ +  =
+
(6)
where m equals the takeover premium, and T the takeover date.  The price ratio can thus be expressed as
There are again four free unobservable parameters g, r, m, and T.
Table 5 displays the fitted values of T and g for various values of m and r.  Under reasonable
assumptions it seems possible to use a takeover premium model to explain some small part of the
structural relationship between preferred and common shares, but not most of it.  The results
generally indicate that even if a takeover were to occur in the very near future the preferred shares
offer the better investment value.  Consider the case where the merger premium equals nine times
the value of the common stock’s future cash flows.
11  For discount rates between 5% and 15% four
out of the eight observed price ratios cannot be explained via the model, even if a takeover were to
occur today.  For one of the remaining firms, investors need to believe that such a takeover will
occur in the next six years.  Thus, even a significant takeover premium can only explain the data in
three out of the eight cases.
Table 5 also includes the implied price-earnings ratio at which the takeover would occur12Given the model’s assumptions this ratio is independent of time, since the expected takeover
price grows in proportion to the firm’s projected earnings.
21
under the model’s assumptions.
12  In many cases they seem too low, and when they are not then T
seems large enough to explain the pricing discrepancies as takeover premiums.  However, this hides
a number of faults.  First, earnings in Russia have been growing at an anemic rate.  Thus, given the
historical data, the purchaser is buying a cash flow that seems as likely to go down as up.  Second,
earnings growth has been weak despite relatively low payout ratios.  It is this combination that makes
it difficult for the model to explain the data under reasonable assumptions.  The current holders of
the equity appear to be paying a very high price, for what seem to be limited immediate cash flows,
and future cash flows will need to depart from the historical pattern of low growth.  
Still, it is somewhat disturbing that the model produces such low predicted price-earnings
ratios upon the implementation of a takeover.  To rectify this, Table 6 calculates g and T under the
assumption that each firm will set c equal to p, the maximum allowed by law, starting immediately
and continuing into the future.  This departure from historical precedent allows the model to produce
seemingly more price-earning takeover ratios.  However, for four of the firms even with projected
price-earnings ratios well over twenty-five one cannot justify the current relative price of the
preferred and common shares.
4 Preferred Share Voting Rights – The Related Literature
There is some recent academic research that sheds light on the various hypothetical
"expropriation" scenarios discussed here.  Zingales (1994) documents evidence that shares with
voting rights trade for as much as an 82% premium over the prices of shares without the right to
vote. He finds that "…on average, nonvoting share have a dividend yield 1.4 times as large as the22
average dividend yield on the MSE [Milan Stock Exchange]." His explanation for this difference is
that controlling shareholders have ways of extracting personal benefits from the firm, and that Italy
does not fully protect minority shareholder rights. His data, however, focus on voting versus non-
voting shares. The Russian preferred shares, particularly firms like Surgutneftegaz, have a vote in
certain circumstances. Thus, it is not clear that the gap can be entirely attributed to the value of the
vote. In addition, the dividends to the Russian preferred shares are bounded below by dividends to
common shareholders. Unless the common is closely-held by management which is potentially
tempted to drain the assets of the firm through corporate perquisites and other shady mechanisms,
it would seem unlikely that the Italian experience helps explain the Russian one.  Furthermore, as
noted earlier, management’s mechanism for draining value must include relatively high cash
payments to the common relative to the preferred shareholders.
Smith and Amaoko-Adu (1995) use merger data from the Toronto Stock Exchange to
investigate the price gap between "super-voting" shares and common shares. They find that super-
voting shares get advantageous terms in mergers - 57% on average. Thus, while the super-voting
premium in share price is modest - 5 to 10 percent - the price premium commanded by super-voting
shares apparently reflects advantageous merger terms times the probability that a merger will occur.
While some Canadian firms have adopted "coat-tail" provisions that require acquiring firms to tender
for minority shares at prices paid to the majority this protection is insufficient to guarantee that those
with the lion's share of the vote do not take the lion's share of the acquisition premium.
The Russian market has both similarities and differences with the Canadian market.  In one
sense, the Canadian figures may underestimate the discount on Russian preferred shares since the
premium of super voting shares over common shares in Canada is modest by comparison to the13 Brunswick UBS Warburg, Russian Equity Guide, p.13.
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premium of Russian common prices over preferred prices.  On the other hand,"coat-tail" provisions
exist in Russia that limit the degree to which the preferred shareholders can have their wealth
expropriated in a takeover.  In particular, SG Warburg’s Russian Equity Guide notes that Article
80(1) of the Law on Joint Stock Companies states that:
If an individual, legal entity and/or group of affiliated companies
acquires 30% or more of a company’s shares, the buyer(s) must offer
to purchase all shareholder’s stakes at the weighted-average market
price over the previous six months.
13
While this provision prevents an acquiring firm from expropriating all minority shareholder value,
it does limit the amount payable to minority shareholders to the pre-acquisition price level - in other
words, minority shareholders will not necessarily get any premium in a merger. Apparently, the law
only requires those making a tender offer for 30% or more of a class to purchase shares in that class
on a pro-rata basis. It does not impose a similar requirement across classes. Thus, it would be
surprising to find that an acquiring firm did not tender first for the common, and then buy the
preferred at the six-month average of the pre-acquisition price levels.  Given these restrictions it
would appear to be a stretch to fit the Smith and Amaoko-Adu results to the current market prices
in Russia. 
The hypothesis  that the common shareholders earn any takeover premium while the
preferred shareholders do not - would further suggest that the discount of Russian preferred shares
should be higher if acquiring firms in Russia pay a high premium when they make a tender offer.
This is a potentially testable hypothesis. The international mergers database SDC records 1,129
mergers or acquisitions for Russian companies. These include consummated, pending, rumored and24
failed transactions involving publicly traded firms during the period. This simple count gives some
measure of the merger and acquisition activity involving Russian companies since the beginning of
privatization - clearly there has been an active market for corporate control in Russia, and thus the
probability of an acquisition of any given company is not zero.
5 Correlated Changes Among Firms 
The degree to which preferred shareholders (or common shareholders) are put at risk of being
expropriated depends on shareholder protection, which in turn is a function of  the legal and
regulatory framework of  corporate governance.   As noted earlier the perceived risk of expropriation
in Russia is so great that the president himself has made it a top priority.  This section explores the
extent to which there may exist a common factor related to expropriation concerns.   As noted
previously, a common factor – if it exists – reflects the market’s interpretation of governance risks,
not necessarily the true ex ante probability of such expropriation occurring.   Firms in different
industries may have different organizational structures, and by the nature of these structures,
different corporate governance issues will have significance for the different types of firms. Still, to
the degree that the common legal and regulatory environment faced by firms changes over time,
there may be a common corporate governance component – of common market opinion component
–  in the relative valuation of preferred and common shares
The data set contains daily closing prices for common and preferred shares of the five liquid,
non-financial firms. These firms are: Unified Energy System (EESR), Lukoil Holdings (LKOH),
Norilsk Nickel (NKEL), Rostelecom (RTKM), and Surgutneftegas (SNGS). The data extends from
October 7, 1996, the earliest date that the prices of both common and preferred shares are available25
for all five firms, to August 31, 2001. This gives yields 1,231 daily closing price observations for
common and preferred shares of the five firms. The data was obtained directly from the Russian
Trading System. All prices are in US dollars. Common and preferred shares of these firms account
for over 53% of the market capitalization of the RTS Index as of October 25, 2001. Although there
are many more companies with preferred and common classes of shares, these are the only ones with
continuous daily time series observations for both classes of shares.
All analysis in this section is performed with prices per share. For each firm i for each date
t compute the ratio of share prices of common to preferred,  . After that extract the /
c p
iti t i t X PP =
principal components from the logged series,  . The results are ln ln / ln ln
cp c p
iti t i t i t i t X PP P P  == − 
shown in the Table 7.  A reasonably high proportion of variance can be attributed to the first
component: 61% -- suggestive of a common factor. Perhaps more importantly, the factor loadings
for the first component are positive for all firms in the sample. This indicates the presence of a
common factor to which all respond in the same way.
To test for  co-movement in the relative valuation of common and preferred shares across
firms a non-parametric test that focuses on directions of movements rather than magnitude is also
examined. This is important because the quality of time series data may be questionable, and
relatively rare events may be informative. Consider the observed ratio of common to preferred prices
for firm i on the date t,  . On a given date the price of a common share,  , can decrease /
c p
iti t i t X PP =
c
it P
( ), remain unchanged, or increase, compared to the previous close. The same can be said 1
c c
iti t P P − <
about the price of preferred,  . Suppose that on some day the price of the common decreased and
p
it P
the price of preferred increased. Then, on such a day, the ratio of common to preferred prices is said























positive news for the preferred shareholders and negative news for the common shareholders.  For
example, news that expropriating preferred share value became more difficult.  Define the indicator




The superscript i stands for "improvement".  Similarly, define the indicator variable 
() w
it Y
to mark the days when the ratio of common to preferred prices had worsened, because the common
price has increased while the preferred price has decreased.
Finally, define a random variable that indicates that either common to preferred price ratio improved




Tests are conducted via a pair-wise   independence test for the time series of the indicator
2 χ 
variables defined above. Table 8 contains computed values for the   test statistics for each pair
2 χ 
of companies. Consider Panel A, where the results for   are reported. Out of 10 company pairs
() i
it Y
the data reject the null hypothesis of independence in ratio improvement for 7 pairs. 
Panel B reports the test statistics for the tests of independence in  .  Out of ten company
() w
it Y
pairs the null hypothesis of independence is rejected in four cases.  For the   variable the results
(3)
it Y
are reported in Panel C.  Here the null hypothesis of independence is rejected for 6 pairs out 10; for
4 of the pairs the results are significant at 1% level. Taken together the evidence seems to point to27
at least some commonality in the behavior of the relative values of common and preferred shares in
the Russian market.
Since the price ratio controls for traditional market factors, the systematic changes observed
in the data cannot be due to changes in the value of the overall economy.  Rather the common
component indicates that some central influence simultaneously changes the value of the preferred
relative to the common.  Off hand, changes in the perceived legal standing of each class would
appear to be a good candidate for the underlying cause, thus implying that corporate control issues
capture at least some of the observed price discrepancies.
6 Conclusion
Russia is a great market in which to study exposure to corporate governance risk. It is now
the “Wild West” of corporate control. This paper examines a phenomenon that appears to violate the
law of one price; the spread between preferred and common shares.  The gap can only be explained
by extreme scenarios relying upon immanent and major failures of investor protection. The analysis
suggests that the preferred share discount is hard to explain by reasonable models of shareholder
expropriation or merger, even under extremely pessimistic assumptions. The models analyzed here
suggest that expropriation would have to involve the expected seizure of more than 65% of
shareholder value by one class of shareholders within about four or five years to justify the current
differential.  Alternatively, an acquisition scenario would have to involve a huge premium, coupled
with a high level of certainty that the merger would go through in order to justify the current spread
in share prices.  While none of these explanations can be logically ruled out, they seem improbable.
By using the relative value of common and preferred shares, one can then back out and quantify the28
implied investor concerns about expropriation and compare them to feasible strategies and realistic
ex ante probabilities.  
The analysis is consistent with two possible explanations.  First, overly-pessimistic views of
the potential for management fraud may be at work.  While Russian shares as a group may reflect
a discount for such possibilities, the split between preferred and common shares would seem far too
large to reflect anything other than extreme, and possibly unwarranted negative sentiment.  Second,
it may be that rational investors are simply producing price series like those found in multiple
equilibria models of asset pricing such as Spiegel (1998).  Differentiating between the two
explanations will require additional data about corporate fundamentals.
Developing precedent and further regulatory activity may be expected to alleviate apparent
shareholder concerns about the potential vulnerability of preferred claims to expropriation and
takeovers, and indeed may already have caused some convergence.  If nothing else, the analytic
framework in this paper offers a means for investors to more formally structure their prior beliefs
about adverse events. This structure, in turn, has the potential to help ascertain what a set of
reasonable assumptions about such events may imply about the relative value of Russian preferred
and common shares.
The price difference between Russian common and preferred shares is of much more than
academic interest. For investors in the Russian market, the differential suggests the potential
profitability of investing in the preferred shares, conditional upon rational evaluation of the
probabilities of various corporate events that impact relative value. For Russian companies, a major
concern is the cost of capital.  The analysis indicates that the yields on the preferred shares are higher
than is warranted by discount and growth rates implied by the common. This would suggest it is29
profitable for Russian firms to buy back their preferred shares at prevailing market prices and finance
such activity with new common equity issues. Of course, if that happened, this would raise the price
of the preferred shares.
The illiquidity and infrequent trading of Russian shares is a major barrier to the empirical
analysis, however it should be recognized that these are endogenous factors.  If, indeed, the observed
ratios are due to investor fears of expropriation it might cause the public anonymous market for
securities to dry up.  The low point in the volume of Russian share trading occurred at the same time
that the average ratio of common and preferred of the five most liquid firms reached a maximum.
While macroeconomic, global factors are typically cited for the Russian 1997 crisis, it is worth
considering that concerns about a corporate governance meltdown may have caused severe
distortions in relative valuations in the period since the 1997 crisis.30
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Table 1
Annual Dividend Payments to Common and Preferred Shares 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
EESR Unified Energy System 0.001618 0.003236 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006228 0.0131
EESRP Unified Energy System 0.001894 0.003788 0.005 0.005 0.00917 0.0152 0.0367
LKOH LUKoil Holdings 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.22 0.25 3
LKOHP LUKoil Holdings 0.5 0.5 1 0.91 2.67 17.45
NKEL Norilsk Nickel 0.887875 00001 . 7 7
NKELP Norilsk Nickel 3.058491 0.40423 0.001846 0.01 0 1.77
R T K M R o s t e l e c o m 0000 . 08222 0 0.1645
RTKMP Rostelecom 0.05 0.447 0.4756 0.5736 0 0.8093
SNGS Surgutneftegas 0.0034 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.00916 0.02
SNGSP Surgutneftegas 0.0052 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.00916 0.086
KUBN Kubanelectrosvyaz 0.172 0.53 0.935 0.6 1.94
KUBNP Kubanelectrosvyaz 2.575 5.299 7.012 3 8.32
LSNG Lenenergo 0.003289 0.003 0.003 0 0
LSNGP Lenenergo 5.32 0.03 0.02 0 0
SVIC Svyazinform of
Chelyabinsk 
0.034154 0.156077 0.461538 1.433 1.965 1.015 1.18
SVICP Svyazinform of
Chelyabinsk 
1.373538 7.050769 12.973 13.341 4.592 5.936
TATN Tatneft 0 0.051 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.1
TATNP Tatneft 0.1 0.1 0.15
The amounts shown are per-share cash dividend amounts, in Russian rubles. Zero means that explicit decision to
omit the dividend was made. Empty cell means no data is reported for the year. Common is on the first line,
preferred (indicated by “P” at the end of the ticker symbol) is on the second line. The numbers shown are exact (not
rounded) dividend amounts.32
Table 2
Preferred Shares in Russia - Summary Statistics
Total number of stocks in RTS Archive (stocks
that once  were and/or still are listed)
909 stocks
- Number of Common 651 stocks
- Number of Preferred 258 stocks
Total number of stocks in Archive with at lest 1
reported trade
472 stocks
The number of companies with both common
and preferred shares in RTS Archives
251 companies
Currently listed equity securities (24 Sep 2001) 389 stocks
Percent of RTS US$ historical trading volume
from trades in common and preferred of the dual
class firms
73%
Percent of RTS US$ historical trading volume
from trades in preferred of the dual class firms
4.5%
Volume of trades in preferred as fraction of
trading volume in dual class firms
6.2%
Percentage of market capitalization of RTS Index
accounted for by preferred stocks
5.55%
Percentage of market capitalization of RTS Index
accounted for by dual class firms in the index 65.21%33
Table 3
Liquidity Measures: Common and Preferred Shares in Dollars and Number of Trades in 2000










Unified Energy System 2,253,688,162 39,158,120 36,054 1,190
Lukoil 940,120,973 84,621,188 8,410 956
Norilsk Nickel 248,069,281 22,186,934 3,388 479
Rostelecom 261,099,094 25,580,545 5,383 966
Surgutneftegaz 501,407,145 198,272,199 9,084 3,766
Kubanelectrosvyaz 6,310,558 1,214,016 301 92
Svyazinform of
Chelyabinsk
2,347,873 929,872 65 56
Tatneft 345,579,477 5,841,688 5,916 313
Relative to Market Value
Unified Energy System 0.465 0.408
Lukoil 0.119 0.096








Panel B: Matching U.S. Firms
Relative to Market Value
Unified Energy System 1.344 2.131
Lukoil 8.825 1.249








Notes: Matching U.S. firms are the ten firms with the closest market capitalizations to the market capitalization of the
Russian security.  For example, the matching sample for Lukoil contains two sets of ten U.S. stocks.  The first set has the
ten closest in market value to the market value of Lukoil common, the second set the ten closest in market value to the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Values of T and g Implied by Prices of Common and Preferred Shares for Various Real Interest Rates and Merger





EESR LKOH NKEL RTKM SNGS KUBN SVIC TATN
Merger Premium: m = 2
PCT/ET 26.1 7.8 602.2 2.7 2.5 2.5 5.1 1.2
5% g  0.024  -0.008  0.043  0.009  0.025  - 0.025  0.019  0.011
T  0   0   397   0   0   0   0   0 
10% g  0.074  0.042  0.093  0.059  0.075  0.025  0.069  0.061
T  0   0   416   0   0   0   0   0 
15% g  0.124  0.092  0.143  0.109  0.125  0.075  0.119  0.111
T  0   0   435   0   0   0   0   0 
Merger Premium: m = 10
PCT/ET 95.7 28.5 2208.1 10.0 9.1 9.2 18.8 4.4
5% g  0.024  -0.008  0.043  0.009  0.025  - 0.025  0.019  0.011
T  22   7   632   0   4   0   0   23 
10% g  0.074  0.042  0.093  0.059  0.075  0.025  0.069  0.061
T  23   8   650   0   4   0   0   24 
15% g  0.124  0.092  0.143  0.109  0.125  0.075  0.119  0.111
T  24   8   694   0   4   0   0   25 
Merger Premium: m = 20
PCT/ET 182.7 54.5 4215.5 19.2 17.3 17.6 35.9 8.4
5% g 0.024 -0.008 0.043 0.009 0.025 -0.025 0.019 0.011
T 5 01 97 3 3 9 3 28 0 4 1
10% g 0.074 0.042 0.093 0.059 0.075 0.025 0.069 0.061
T 5 22 07 6 8 9 3 48 0 4 3
15% g 0.124 0.092 0.143 0.109 0.125 0.075 0.119 0.111
T 55 21 803 10 35 9 0 45
Notes:  The model takes the merger premium and the interest rate r as given and then solves for g and T.  Merger
Premium: 1 equals a 100% premium, 10 a 1000% premium, etcetera.   The value of T states that the current common
to preferred price ratio can only be explained if a takeover occurs within  T years, the firm continues to grow at a rate
g between now and then, and the discount rate equals r.  A value of T=0 implies an immediate takeover at the
multiple of m will not equilibrate the value of the preferred and common shares.  PCT/ET equals the model’s implied
price-earnings ratio for the common shares at the takeover date T.  This value depends only upon the implied growth
and interest rates, and not on T, since the takeover price is assumed to grow proportionately with earnings.36
Table 6.
Values of T and g Implied by Prices of Common and Preferred Shares for Various Real Interest Rates and Merger





EESR LKOH NKEL RTKM SNGS KUBN SVIC TATN
Merger Premium: m = 2
PCT/ET 73.1 45.3 602.2 13.5 10.6 10.7 25.8 1.8
5% g 0.024 -0.008 0.043 0.009 0.025 -0.025 0.019 0.011
T 003 9 7 00000
10% g 0.074 0.042 0.093 0.059 0.075 0.025 0.069 0.061
T 004 1 6 00000
15% g 0.124 0.092 0.143 0.109 0.125 0.075 0.119 0.111
T 004 3 5 00000
Merger Premium: m = 10
PCT/ET 268.1 166.0 2208.1 49.4 38.9 39.6 94.5 6.6
5% g 0.024 -0.008 0.043 0.009 0.025 -0.025 0.019 0.011
T 22 7 632 0 4 0 0 23
10% g 0.074 0.042 0.093 0.059 0.075 0.025 0.069 0.061
T 23 8 650 0 4 0 0 24
15% g 0.124 0.092 0.143 0.109 0.125 0.075 0.119 0.111
T 24 8 694 0 4 0 0 25
Merger Premium: m = 20
PCT/ET 511.8 316.8 4215.5 94.3 74.4 75.5 180.4 12.6
5% g 0.024 -0.008 0.043 0.009 0.025 -0.025 0.019 0.011
T 5 01 97 3 3 9 3 20 0 4 1
10% g 0.074 0.042 0.093 0.059 0.075 0.025 0.069 0.061
T 5 22 07 6 8 9 3 40 0 4 3
15% g 0.124 0.092 0.143 0.109 0.125 0.075 0.119 0.111
T 55 21 803 10 35 0 0 45
Notes: Historically the common has received a lower dividend per share than the preferred.  The calculations in this
table assume that going forward the common will receive an amount equal to the preferred, which is the maximum
allowed by law.  The model takes the merger premium and the interest rate r as given and then solves for g and T. 
Merger Premium: 1 equals a 100% premium, 10 a 1000% premium, etcetera.   The value of T states that the current
common to preferred price ratio can only be explained if a takeover occurs within  T years, the firm continues to
grow at a rate g between now and then, and the discount rate equals r.  A value of T=0 implies an immediate takeover
at the multiple of m will not equilibrate the value of the preferred and common shares.  PCT/ET equals the model’s
implied price-earnings ratio for the common shares at the takeover date T.  This value depends only upon the implied




Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5
Standard
Deviation 1.748 1.062 0.746 0.419 0.292
Proportion of
Variance 0.611 0.225 0.111 0.036 0.017
Cumulative
Proportion 0.611 0.836 0.947 0.983 1.000
Factor Loadings
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5
EESR 0.504 -0.222 -0.350 -0.758 -0.009
LKOH 0.430 0.371 0.686 -0.135 -0.435
NKEL 0.161 0.820 -0.536 0.115 -0.023
RTKM 0.486 -0.375 -0.285 0.570 -0.466
SNGS 0.548 0.005 0.195 0.263 0.77038
Table 8.
Chi-Square Tests of Independence
Panel A Panel B
Improvement in the Common to Preferred Price Ratio. Worsening of the Common to Preferred Price Ratio.
Chi-Square Test Statistics. Chi-Square Test Statistics.
EESR LKOH NKEL RTKM SNGS EESR LKOH NKEL RTKM SNGS
EESR 5.841** 0.141 4.316** 3.244* EESR 13.299*** 2.324 14.368*** 1.874
LKOH 5.841** 4.842** 0.145 8.693*** LKOH 13.299*** 3.284* 0.002 2.499
NKEL 0.141 4.842** 3.177* 0.596 NKEL 2.324 3.284* 5.789** 0.747
RTKM 4.316** 0.145 3.177* 4.834** RTKM 14.368*** 0.002 5.789** 0.002
SNGS 3.244* 8.693*** 0.596 4.834** SNGS 1.874 2.499 0.747 0.002
Critical values for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels are 2.706, 3.841, and 6.635, respectively. Based on Chi-Square distribution with 1
degree of freedom.
Panel C Panel D
Days classified into three categories. Chi-Square Test Statistics. Days classified into three categories. Pearson Correlations.
EESR LKOH NKEL RTKM SNGS EESR LKOH NKEL RTKM SNGS
EESR
19.085***  6.673 23.94***  6.474
EESR
LKOH















6.474 20.784*** 5.139 8.986*
SNGS
0.062 0.125 0.009 0.080
(0.030) (0.000) (0.766) (0.005)
Critical values for 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels are 7.779,
9.488,  and 13.277, respectively. Based on Chi-Square distribution
with 4 d.f.
Cell contents: correlation (p-value).
Data: Closing stock prices from RTS.Figure 1





























































































































































































































































































































































RTS Volume (US$) RTS CloseFigure 2






















































































































































































































































RTS$ Index EW CP IndexFigure 3
Common and Preferred Shares. Closing Daily Prices in US$












































































































































































































































































































































 Unified Energy System (EESR), Lukoil 
Holdings (LKOH), Norilsk Nickel (NKEL), Rostelecom 
(RTKM), and Surgutneftegas (SNGS).
Prices of common and preferred shares are shown for each 
firm.
Data Source: RTS.
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